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The European Union and Israel
A lasting and ambiguous "special" relationship 
Caroline du Plessix
Translation : Judith Grumbach
1 Few players on the international  scene are able to claim such a rich and ambiguous
relationship  as  Israel  and  the  European  Union1 (EU).  The  EU  is  one  of  the  prime
commercial partners of Israel, along with the United States, with a commercial exchange
volume that  reached 20.2 billion Euros in 20092.  On the geostrategical  level,  the two
players cooperate more and more actively on common threats, such as an Iranian nuclear
power. On the cultural and scientific as well as the commercial level,  the EU is often
defined as the Israeli "hinterland"3 due to the latter's regional isolation. Their relations
have proven to be profound and enduring – since the establishment of the diplomatic
relations in 1959 – despite a particularly restrained geopolitical context. The different
crises that have affected the regional stability – the Six-Day-War of 1967, the October War
of 1973, the Lebanon War as well as the two Intifadas of 1987 and 2000 – have never
permanently threatened the deepening of their relations. Yet, it does not change the fact
that  their  recurrent  political  dissent  regularly  characterizes  the  course  of  events.
Following Operation "Cast Lead", led by Israel in the Gaza Strip from December 27, 2008
to January 18, 2009, the ratification of certain agreements between Israel and the EU has
been officially frozen, more particularly a protocol on the participation of Israel within
the EU-programs,  which were signed on May 17,  2008.  Incidentally,  shortly  after  the
events of the "Arab Spring", which were sparked off by the popular uprisings in Tunisia
in  December  2010/  January  2011,  the  EU  and  Israel  have  been  divided  on  their
significance: democratic movements that should be encouraged, according to the first; a
threat  that  could even destabilize the Middle East  and its  own security according to
Israel.
2 Thus, their political relations have turned out to be especially ambiguous. The fact is that
in Israel, the EU is often perceived as hostile4; the statements of the European Council are
usually  characterized  as  "pro  Palestinians."  Certain  authors  even  maintain  that  this
tendency is reflected in the "linkage", thus determining the development of the relations
between the EU and Israel at discretion of the latter to act in pursuance of the "Two-State
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solution"5. Yet, from the European point of view, this position toward the conflict, which
is defended by the Member States, does not constitute a hostile declaration toward Israel,
quite on the contrary. The creation of a Palestinian State is actually considered to be the
only long-term solution for the Israeli security, thus favoring a regional stability6. Thus,
the "linkage" is not supposed to act against Israel but for its interest. 
3 We characterize the relations between the EU and Israel as "special" due to two main
reasons. First, Israel enjoys a privileged status vis-à-vis the EU, which is distinguished by
a  continuous  strengthening  of  their  agreements  despite  their  political  differences.
Second, this relationship seems to be doomed to their fervor. As history is the source of
understanding,  of  cultural  affinity  but  also  of  perpetual  mistrust  between these  two
players, declarations of friendship do regularly follow strong criticism on both sides.
4 In this article we will strive to render an account of the special and ambiguous character
of this relationship through the study of three factors: historical, realist and normative.
We will start with the historical factor – more specifically, with the relations between
Israel on the one hand and France, Germany and Great Britain on the other hand – and its
influence on the EU-Israel relationship. Then, we will examine their mutual interests by
studying the deepening process of their agreements in the different sectors – economics,
science  and  security  – in  a  challenging  environment.  Finally,  we  will  compare  their
perceptions as well as their mutual expectations and we will attempt to determine to
what extent they are able to determine the future of the EU-Israeli relations.
 
History, at the source of Israel's ‘special status’ vis-à-
vis the EU
5 History has profoundly marked the relationship between Israel and the EU, for better and
for  worse.  If  it  provides  cultural  tools,  which  will  encourage  a  better  mutual
understanding, it is also the source of mistrust and resentment, as the wounds of the past
are still quite present in their minds. We will present at first the relations between Israel
and the European countries – in particular, France, Germany and Great Britain – and their
influence  on  the  EU-Israeli  relationship;  subsequently,  we  will  concentrate  on  the
interdependency between the history of the Jewish and European peoples. 
 
France's, Great Britain's and Germany's relations with Israel and their
impact on the EU’s policy 
6 The special status that Israel enjoys vis-à-vis the EU must be understood in the light of
the historical process leading to the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 and nine years
later  to  the  creation  of  the  European  Economic  Community  (EEC).  It  must  also  be
understood as the fruit of the relations between Israel and the European countries. While
the Second World War provided the essential momentum for their respective creations,
the history of both Israel and the EU are rooted in old ideas and intensive debates. Insofar
as they must confront specific problems, which are determined by the different regional
environments  and  which  are  related  to  specific  myths,  their  views  differ  regularly.
Nevertheless, their relations are based on the shared ideals of democracy, human rights
and freedom7, principles that they both are supposed to abide by in order to ensure their
legitimacy internally and on the international scene. 
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7 Shortly after the creation of Israel in May 1948, Germany – because of the Holocaust – and
Great Britain – because of its resolution to limit the Jewish immigration to Palestine after
the publication of the British White Paper of 1939 – are considered by Israel to be the
"black beasts"8. France, on its part, had been Israel's main strategic ally since 19569 until
the  rupture  in  1967.  Indeed,  shortly  after  the  visit  of  Abba  Eban,  the  Israeli  Prime
Minister, to Paris at the end of May 1967 – when Egypt deployed its army in Sinai and
decided to impose the blockade of the Straits of Tiran – de Gaulle decides to stop the
delivery of arms to Israel10.  From the French point of view, this decision answered a
desperate  intention to  prevent  an Israeli  attack  that  could  have  harmed the  French
interests in the region11. In Israel, it was received like an unacceptable betrayal since its
survival was at risk. Hence, shortly after the Six-Day-War, the United States replaced
France and became Israel’s unfailing ally. 
8 These turbulent relations have a strong impact on the perception of the EU in Israel.
Moreover,  the  elaborated position by the  EU toward the  Israeli-Palestinian question,
which is based on the European Council's Declaration of the Venice Summit of June 1980,
is often seen in Israel of being "pro-Palestinian". In this Declaration, the Member States,
under the leadership of France,  recognize the right of the Palestinian people to self-
determination and oppose the Israeli occupation of the occupied territories. According to
certain authors, this declaration deepens "the lack of the EU's legitimacy in the eyes of
the Israelis"12. At any rate, the Israeli distrust toward the Europeans explains the weak
impact  of  the  European position  on  the  "hearts  and  minds".  The  lack  of  a  genuine
European-Israeli dialogue that could facilitate a better mutual understanding constrains
the quality and fruitfulness of their relations13. 
9 In addition, the European's belief in an effective multilateralism in international relations
often clash with the Israeli distrust toward the international community14. The European
view, which consists in promoting an institutionalization of international relations in
order to make these more predictable and more peaceful, faces quite often the Israeli
desire for autonomy15 from a strategic point of view. This desire distinguishes itself in the
investment of a strong and technologically advanced army, the obligatory drafting and an
important  reserve  force  in  Israel,  whereas  the  tendency across  Europe is  rather  the
demilitarization16.
 
Sources of distrust and mutual understanding 
10 The Israeli suspicion toward the EU draws its roots from the persecution of the Jewish
people on the European continent as well as from the atrocities committed by the Nazis
and their allies during the Second World War17. As a result, according to certain Israelis,
"Europe cannot be trusted"18, inasmuch as its political positions reflect its "anti-Semitic
tendency"19. This also explains the absence of the Israeli desire to have the EU strongly
involved in the peace process,  including other factors – as for example the American
reluctance in this respect20. 
11 History can also be exploited in order to delegitimize the European position when it
opposes  the Israeli  interests.  For example,  in 1980,  the Begin administration did not
hesitate to compare the Declaration of  the Venice Summit with the work written by
Hitler: "Since Mein Kampf was written, the entire word, including Europe, has never ever
heard anything more explicit regarding the aspiration of destroying the Jewish State and
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its nation," he states21. Closer to us, certain authors maintain that more than 60 years
after the end of the Second World War, anti-Semitism is at its peak in Europe22. 
12 Anyway,  it  is  clear  that  recent  history  has  significantly  influenced  Member  States’
policies toward Israel.  Between 1948 and 1951, shortly after the war, the difficulty of
finding "places for the Jews of Europe" caused the departure of 332,000 of them to the
new State of Israel,  in particular from Germany and Poland,  whereas 165,000 left  for
France,  Great  Britain,  Australia  or  America23.  In  light  of  this  historical  reality,  the
financial compensations, paid by the FRG to Israel and following the Treaty of Bonn in
1952, allowed Germany to reinforce its legitimacy on the international scene, which had
been clouded by its responsibility in the war. Today, unified Germany as well as Poland or
the  Czech Republic  – three  countries  that  have  been particularly  marked by  Nazism
– continue to  strongly  support  Israel  from a  political  point  of  view.  Conversely,  this
support allows them to defend more liberally the common position of the EU in regards
to the conflict: the Two-States solution – one Israeli and the other Palestinian.
13 That being so, history constitutes a source of mutual understanding between the EU and
Israel. The ideology of the political and intellectual movement regarding the foundation
of Israel – Zionism – has been growing on the European continent from the end of the 19th
century.  Without the European Age of  Enlightenment,  it  would have definitely never
existed24. The Jewish people have deeply contributed to the European history and culture
and the European and Jewish schools of thought have had a mutual effect on each other:
"Mendelssohn [Moshe] was to Kant what Freud was to psychology and Einstein to physics
(…), Matisse to Chagall, Hegel to Pinsker"25. Yet, it doesn't change the fact that the appeal
for auto-emancipation, comprised in the Zionist ideal, also reflects the complexity of the
relations between the Jews and Europe, inasmuch as it suggests that "the conventional
wisdom of Jewish emancipation within European society was doomed to failure"26. 
14 On  the  subject  of  demographics,  different  figures  demonstrate  the  long-standing
closeness  of  the  Israeli  and  European  societies.  A  study  by  the  Konrad  Adenauer
Foundation confirms that in 2009, 40% of Israelis were eligible to receive a European
citizenship due to their  European roots27,  thus facilitating their  free movement.  This
reality  translates  itself  onto  the  economic  plan  by  the  fact  that  within  the  foreign
branches of the 20 biggest Israeli multinational companies, 48% were European in 200928.
Sharing  ideas  and common values  do  indeed make the  interaction between the  two
players easier. Thus, in spite of being possible to defend the opinion, according to which
the Israeli society Americanizes itself29 or will even become a more and more oriental30,
Mediterranean31,  society,  actually  “a combination of  Krakow and Casablanca”32,  these
common cultural factors between Israel and the EU are essential tools that might even
reinforce their relations and thus, overcome their disagreements.
 
A continuous deepening of their agreements in a
challenging regional context, the "linkage" in question 
15 The relations between the EU and Israel are characterized by the regular improvement of
their agreements in the different sectors. Today, Israel has one of the most advanced
status among the non-member States regarding its contractual relations with the EU.
Thus, in the eyes of many Israelis, the EU is considered their natural economic and in
particular, scientific hinterland33. The strategic cooperation between these two players has
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grown, more particularly since the attacks of September 11th due to the perception of
common threats. 
 
Israel’s perception of the EU as its natural economic and scientific 
hinterland 
16 The perception of the EU by Israel as its hinterland – due to the hostility of its regional
environment  – has  significantly  promoted  the  Israeli  economic  development.  Even
though Israel does not belong to the European Economic Area (EEA)34,  as Norway for
example, and is not located on the European continent, as Switzerland for example, that
is  a  member  of  the  European Free  Trade Association (EFTA)35,  it  is  particularly  well
integrated in the European market as well as in a certain number of European programs36.
The first  agreement of  free trade between the EU and Israel  was signed in 197537.  It
constitutes a clear schedule that aims at reducing customs, especially on industrialized
products, and the elimination of these duties on 70% of Israeli agricultural products that
are exported to the EU. According to Israeli sources38, this agreement is Israel's prime
success vis-à-vis the EU. Since then, the development of their economic relations hasn't
stopped making progress, despite being regulated by fluctuations of the peace process. 
17 New negotiations between the two players took place at the beginning of the 90's.  A
"special status" was granted to Israel by the European Council in Essen in 1994, when the
Barcelona Process was about to be launched: "The European Council believes that Israel,
on account of its high level of economic development, should enjoy special status in its
relations with the EU on the basis of reciprocity and common interests. In the process,
regional economic development in the Middle East including in the Palestinian areas, will
aslo be boosted"39. This status will thus guarantee Israel its privileged status towards the
EU, regardless of the conditions or terms of its agreements with the latter.
18 The second major agreement – the "‘Association Agreement" – is signed in 1995, shortly
after the Oslo agreements. It is in effect the Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement that will
give the EU the political justification for this new development. Besides, the EU benefits
from this opportunity in order to launch its  own initiative,  the "Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership"  – which is  also  called the "Barcelona Process"  – aiming at  economically
contributing to the Israeli-Arab peace process. The new Israeli-European agreement is
thus  framed  by  this  initiative  and  calls  itself  accordingly  "the  Euro-Mediterranean
Agreement  that  establishes  a  partnership  with  Israel,"  the  same  name  as  the  other
agreements that were signed with the other Mediterranean countries in spite of the more
advanced status of Israel towards the EU. It expands the agreement's scope of 1975 in the
industrial  and  agricultural  sectors  and  includes  a  series  of  mutual  agricultural
concessions  that  concern  approximately  90%  of Israeli  exports  to  the  EU.  Different
institutions are moreover established, mainly the EU-Israel Association Council, which
meets once a year and which aims at providing a political initiation, necessary for the
strengthening of their relations. Even though Israel does not like the Euro-Mediterranean
appellation – Israel doesn't quite appreciate its regional reference – the framework of its
agreements,  which  dictates  common  rules  for  all  Mediterranean  countries,  presents
certain advantages in different sectors.  It  concerns in particular the principle of  the
accumulation  of  rules  of  origin  in  the  Euro-Mediterranean  zone.  It  allows  the
Mediterranean  countries  to  develop  their  commercial  trade  so  as  to  guarantee
accumulated cuts on customs duty regarding exports to the EU. 
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19 Their relations have been developing gradually despite the failure of the peace process, in
particular in the public, agricultural and scientific sectors. The special status that Israel
enjoys is particularly evident in the last sector. It is in effect the first Non-member State
to sign an agreement with the EU in 1996, which allows its participation at the Fourth
European  Framework  Program,  the  European  research  platform.  Israel  is  currently
actively participating in the Seventh Framework Agreement (FP 7 2007-2012), functioning
as an associated state40. According to figures that were provided by ISERD (Israel-Europe
Research  and  Development  Directorate  for  the  EU  Framework  Program)  – the  agency  that
coordinates the research program in Israel – the financial value of European projects, in
which Israeli researchers were involved, reached Euro 4.3 billion, of which 1.5 billion
were for industrial projects, in August 2010. 
20 The breakout of the Second Intifada slows down the progress of the agreements between
the EU and Israel; however, it does not impede the renewal of Israel's participation in the
European research program in 2003. It is only in 2005 that a qualitative jump occurs in
their relations. The first EU’s action plan in the framework of the neighborhood policy41 is
actually signed with Israel  at  the end of  2004.  It  does not include major agreements
between the two parties  but  it  lists  potential  future agreements in different  sectors.
Following this expansion wave of 2004, the new European paradigm of "neighborhood
policy", which encompasses agreements with neighbors, from the East as well as from the
South,  is  a  major  evolution  for  Israel.  In  fact,  contrary  to  the  Euro-Mediterranean
partnership agreements, which created a de facto regional interdependence, the action
plans are based on a "bilateralisation" of relations between the EU and the signatory
states. Israel has campaigned for the recognition of its particular status, compared with
the  other  states  in  the  region,  and  thus,  on  the  whole,  this  approach  satisfies  its
expectations42.  These  agreements  are  based  on  the  concept  of  "differentiation".  The
deepening of  the relations with each state does from now on depend on its  level  of
commitment and not on all  the Mediterranean countries  anymore.  Ten sectoral  sub-
committees  are  thus  created  between  Israel  and  the  EU  that  aim at  examining  the
developmental potentials in everyone of the following sectors:  1.  industry-commerce-
service,  2.  domestic  market,  3.  research-innovation-society  of  information-education-
culture, 4. transportation-energy-environment, 5. political dialogue and cooperation, 6.
justice,  7.  economic and financial sector,  8.  cooperation on customs matters,  9.  social
services-immigration,  10.  agriculture  and  fishing.  A  last  sub-committee,  which  is
informal, calls itself the "human rights and international organization".
21 This new agreement is also the first one to clearly state a linkage between the deepening
of relations between Israel and the EU and the resolution of the conflict. Israel is in effect
committed to "working together with the EU, on a bilateral basis and as a member of the
Quartet, with the aim of reaching a comprehensive settlement of the Israeli/Palestinian
conflict and a permanent two state solution with Israel and a Palestinian state living side
by side in peace and security in accordance with the roadmap, and the obligations of the
parties set out in it"43. The introduction of the agreement does furthermore clearly state
that "the level of ambition of the EU/Israel relationship will depend on the degree of
commitment to common values as well as the mutual interests and the capacity of each
party to implement jointly agreed priorities"44. Thus, with its signature, Israel commits
itself  to  act  in  accordance  with  the  Two-States  solution  if  it  wishes  to  significantly
strengthen its relations with the EU. 
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22 Two years after the action plan's ratification, shortly after the international conference
of Annapolis in November 2007 – when the political regional context seems relatively
stable – on the initiative of Israel, the EU agrees to upgrade the level and intensity of their
relations  during  the  Eighth  Association  Council  on  June  16,  2008.  It  includes  the
improvement of their political dialogue, the deepening of Israel’s integration within the
European Single Market through a better accordance of the Israeli legislation with the
European acquis, a better cooperation in the war against crime, terrorism and money
laundering,  an increasing cooperation in the aerial sector,  a future agreement in the
education  sector  through  the  participation  in  the  Erasmus  Mundus  and  Tempus
programs, the opening of the European Health Program 2008-2013 to Israel, and finally, a
facilitation in the trilateral cooperation with the Palestinians on the issues of energy,
transportation and commerce. In its declaration regarding the Association Council, the
EU confirms the existence of the linkage: "The process of developing a closer EU-Israeli
partnership needs to be, and to be seen, in the context of the broad range of our common
interests and objectives which notably include the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict through the implementation of the 2SS"45.
23 Yet, further to the Israeli Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip between December 27 and
January 18, 2009, the EU decides to officially freeze the upgrade process. Nevertheless,
certain agreements are ratified after January 2009. One such case is the agreement on
"agricultural products, processed agricultural products and fish and fishering products"
ratified in January 2010, which allows according to Israeli figures a 20% growth in Israeli
exports in the subsequent years. In the other sectors, the ice is more visible. Thus, the
ratification of two agreements finds itself put on ice: the first one concerns a protocol on
Israel's participation in the Community's programs, which was signed in May 200846 ; the
second one is an ACAA (Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of  Industrial
Products)  on  pharmaceutical  products,  which  was  signed  in  May  2010.  These  two
agreements  require  the  approval  of  the  European  Parliament  – obligatory  since  the
Treaty of Lisbon came into effect – before being ratified. Nevertheless,  the Tenth EU-
Israel Association Council of February 22, 2011 confirms that "in this framework the EU is
prepared to further explore with Israel  the opportunities still  offered by the current
Action plan."47 In other words, the official freeze of their relations would expire, yet the
development of the year 2011 did not really demonstrate this.
 
An international context favoring a growing strategic cooperation 
24 The EU – bilaterally and conjointly – and Israel benefit from a growing cooperation in the
security sector. This is the result of a growing EU empathy toward the kinds of threats
that weigh on Israel's security, in particular the threat of terrorism48, after the attacks of
September 11, 2001 in New York, which came after those of Madrid in 2004 and then, of
London  in  2005.  They  declared  their  common  willingness  to  cooperate  in  counter-
terrorism and intelligence sharing in order to reduce the access of terrorist networks to
economic  and  financial  resources  notably,  such  as  drugs  or  money  laundering49.
Moreover, during the Eighth Euro-Israeli association council of June 2008, the two parties
committed themselves to deepen their strategic relations. Israel should be invited to ad
hoc reunions of different working groups in order to discuss subjects like the war against
terrorism, a cooperation within international forums, the European security and defense
politics, and the control of arms trade50. Conclusions that were adopted by the Council of
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the EU in December 2008 anticipated an Israeli  participation within certain European
working groups, Euro-Israeli ministerial meetings at different levels, as well as a more
frequent Israeli access to the PSC (Political and Security Committee)51. Nevertheless, the
implementation of this strategic upgrade has been frozen since Operation Cast Lead. This
demonstrates that the development of their strategic relations is also strained by their
political dissent. In addition, a more technical agreement is signed on June 1, 2009, which
should facilitate the exchange of classified information between the EU and Israel. It must
‘fullfil the objectives of full and effective cooperation between the Parties on matters of
common interest  relating in  particular  to  defence and security  issues"52. Finally,  the
Israeli  cooperation with European organizations and institutions that fight crime and
terrorism has developed in particular during these last few years53.
25 Indeed, the countries tend to create alliances according to their perception of common
threats54. International terrorism, as for example the perspective of an Iranian nuclear
threat, has now become a major concern for the two players. Since 2003, France, Germany
and Great Britain have headed an international coalition – with the United States, Russia
and China – the EU3+3, which aims at preventing the development of Iranian nuclear
weapons through diplomatic and financial sanctions. Israel is extremely worried by the
Iranian nuclear threat and cooperates thus with certain European countries, including
France, in order to lead certain operations that aim at delaying the expansion of this
program.  Besides,  Hamas – the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in the
Palestinian Territories – is  also perceived as a threat by Israel  and the EU.  After the
legislative Palestinian elections of January 25, 2006 that lead to its victory, the Member
States, through the European institutions, decided in fact not to support the new Hamas
government that was established in March through a freeze of its direct funding to the
Palestinian Authority (PA), of which the EU is the main donor. From a political point of
view,  the Member States  are opposed to the legitimation of  this  government on the
international scene, based on three criteria that are the condition of its recognition by
the Quartet Members55, being the recognition of Israel, the renunciation of violence and
the recognition of agreements that were signed previously by the PA. A Hamas leadership
of the Palestinian Territories is thus considered by Israel, the EU and the United States as
a threat to the regional stability as well as to the continuity of the peace process. These
different players encourage thus, either directly or indirectly, the conflict between the
PA's security forces and those of Hamas56, a conflict that lead to Hamas takeover of the
Gaza Strip in June57. 
26 The EU and Israel have actually a common interest in ensuring regional stability. Yet,
they disagree quite often on the strategy to adopt and their disagreement concerns first
and foremost the Palestinian question. Thus, public coverage is given to their differences
as for example the EU's criticism toward the construction of new blocks in the West Bank
as  well  as  in  East  Jerusalem  or  also  its  support  for  the  decision  of  2004  by  the
International Court of Justice against the construction of a separation wall. Furthermore,
the  Member  States  criticized  openly  the  land  attack  from  January  3  2009  during
Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip that followed air attacks, lead by the Israeli army
from January 3, 200958. These differences between the EU and Israel are reinforced by
divergent views and expectations. Since they can profoundly influence the future of their
relations, the following outline will be described.
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Dissonant views and ambiguous expectations
determining the future of the EU-Israeli relations
27 Firstly, the manner on how Israel and the EU understand the issue of security differs
strikingly, mainly due to their geographic environment and to their divergent strategic
culture.  The strategy of  the European security  of  December 2003 answers  a  "global"
definition of security. It describes the economic development, the respect for law and the
democratic governance of  the "neighboring" States as the best method to assure the
stability at its borders and thus, its own long-term security. Furthermore, no common
enemy is identified59 except common threats as for example, terrorism, weapons of mass
destruction or even states that are considered to be "weak." Israel for its part insists that
it is surrounded by enemies, either by future potential entities or by enemy states, the
main one being Iran. The "Arab Spring" proves how fragile everything can be, even the
peace agreement that was signed with Egypt in 1979. This is exemplified by the frequent
attacks against the Egyptian gas pipeline due to its export to Israel or by the accessibility
of the Sinai region to criminal networks. The budget differences of the EU and its Member
States as well as the Israeli ones reflect these differences as well as the social choices
carried out by these actors. The EU's most costly item in 2011 is entitled "cohesion for the
growth and employment" and represents 36% of its total budget60.  In Israel, the main
budgetary item in 2011 is the one of the Ministry of Defense, in Hebrew the Ministry of
Security61, including 1/7th of the total budget. In comparison, the most costly item for
2011/2012 in Great Britain – the Member State that has the highest defense budget within
the EU – is the one of social protection. Its defense sector represents only 1/17th of the
total budget62. The remarks made by Moshe Dayan when he was the Minister of Defense at
the beginning of the 70's, demonstrate these different societal choices: "It is impossible to
hold two banners at the same time," he says in order to justify the priority given to the
"security banner" over the "banner of the social well-being" and other societal objectives
63. Nevertheless, the importance of the social protest movement in Israel, which started in
the summer of 2011 and which is also called social justice (tzedek hevrati) – in a country
where the wealth gaps between the different social  classes are the highest in all  the
countries of the OECD64 – demonstrates the limits of these societal choices.
28 Secondly, being dependant on these divergent perceptions, their doctrines on the use of
force differ, too. Israel reacts to the threats, which it faces, by the use of frequent force.65
The objective is to periodically deter its enemies from all significant attacks66 – against
Hezbollah in South Lebanon during the summer of 2006 or Hamas in the Gaza Strip from
the  end  of  December  2008  to  mid-January  2009.  In  contrast,  the  EU,  as  a  regional
organization, is not directly responsible for the common defense of its Member States
given that NATO has been playing this role until now67. Besides, the Member States have
not had to face existential threats on their own territories since the end of the Cold War68.
Nevertheless, the war in the Balkans has proved them that they need to create a capacity
for  autonomous  action  at  the  EU  level,  supported  by  credible  military  forces69 and
therefore, that they need a genuine common defense policy70. Furthermore, the armies of
the Member States must also adapt to the new challenges that are caused by new types of
battle spaces, which are often located in distant territories in Africa or the Middle East71.
These different realities create divergent evaluations on the threat and strategy to be
employed.  This can be seen by the reaction of  certain leaders of  European countries
The European Union and Israel
Bulletin du Centre de recherche français à Jérusalem, 22 | 2011
9
regarding Operation Cast Lead, who denounce the presence of the Israeli army in Gaza,
and  also  by  discussions  between  Europeans  and Israelis  on  the  strategy  toward  the
Iranian threat, even though their final objectives are similar on this matter. 
29 Thirdly, as already seen, the European and Israeli views as to the Palestinian question
differ significantly. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his coalition – made up of
the  Likud,  the  ultra-orthodox  party  Shas and  Israel  Beitenu,  Avigdor  Lieberman's
nationalist party – maintain, in order to justify their little enthusiasm on the creation of a
Palestinian State, that Palestinians’ mind "are not ripe enough." They maintain that if a
Palestinian State would be created, it would not lead to peace, insofar as the Palestinians
– who cannot be satisfied with their borders – will just not stop attacking Israel in order
to reclaim their lands. Thus, from their point of view, the creation of a Palestinian State
would not solve the Palestinian issue.  Besides,  even though Benjamin Netanyahu has
endorsed the Two-State  solution during his  speech at  Bar Ilan on June 15,  2009,  the
absence of consensus on the borders of this State and on the commitment to a clear
schedule  prevents  any  significant  progress.  The  linkage is  thus  perceived  by  this
government as an obstacle to be avoided during negotiations with the EU and the pursued
strategy consists in promoting negotiations on technical subjects, thus the least political
as possible.
30 With regards to their mutual expectations, which result from these different views, these
have strongly constrained the framework of their current and future relations. Basically,
the EU expects Israel to abide by certain of the norms – whether technical or political
– belonging to the "acquis communautaire" if it wishes to integrate further the European
Single  Market  or  to  participate  in  its  programs.  This  is  supposed  to  allow a  better
predictability of Israel’s policies as well as of its companies thus stabilizing their mutual
relations in the long run72. Regarding the political issue, the EU would also want Israel to
act in accordance with the Two-State solution. And yet, Israel has never totally stopped
constructing new living blocks it  its colonies in the West Bank, which proves its low
enthusiasm toward this solution. Regarding the technical issues, the adoption of EU legal
norms within the scientific and economic sectors, in particular, has enabled the EU – as
well as Israel – to achieve long-term economic gains. This allows the EU to increase its
normative power73 – insofar as the Israeli enterprises that want the export goods to the
EU are forced to adopt EU technical standards – thus facilitating the commercial trade
between  the  two  actors.  This  process  of  adoption  of  EU  standards  is  described  as
"spontaneous"74, since it is in Israeli companies' best interest to adopt them. It is more
problematic when it is "requested" by the EU insofar as it creates antagonistic reactions
in Israel for reasons that are rational as well  as irrational.  The cost of the necessary
investment in order to adopt the European acquis in the different sectors seems rather
too high and the benefit hardly calculable in the short term75.  In addition, when this
process concerns political issues – minority rights, immigration, peace process, or the
economic cooperation in the Mediterranean – it is often perceived as affecting the Israeli
sovereignty. Conversely, from the European point of view, the adoption of the acquis
communautaire is one of the necessary conditions for any country that wants to reinforce
its relations with the EU.
31 From the Israeli point of view, it is essential for the EU to recognize the "special status"
that it was granted by the Essen Council in 1994. This request is systematically repeated
in the Israeli discourse76. Israel does not really wish to become a member of the EU77, for
the time being at least, despite declarations from certain elites78, but wants to deepen as
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much as possible, and in a bilateral  manner,  its  agreements with the EU in different
sectors:  first  and  foremost  trade,  then  science,  transportation  and  education.
Furthermore, this deepening of their relations would also concern the strategic level as
Israel wants to become associated to different working groups or EU institutions whose
decisions affect the EU's Common foreign and security policy as well as its defense policy.
From the EU point of view, Israel's participation in certain EU working groups would
allow to achieve a better comprehension of mutual views and interests, but this strategic
upgrade remains globally subjected to Israel’s abidance with the two state solution.
32 These different expectations between the EU and Israel – resulting from a rich mutual
history  as  well  as  from divergent  political  views  – are  crucial  while  the  two players
renegotiate  the  normative  framework  of  their  relations.  This  ambiguous  "special 
relationship” has endured since the establishment of their diplomatic relations in 1959
thanks to the deepening of their agreements in numerous sectors. Nevertheless, as we
have seen, it is also constrained by a particularly strained political context. A renewed
strategic dialogue between the two actors would allow for a better mutual understanding,
in particular on the Palestinian question. 
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